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ABSTRACT
Security games provide a framework for allocating limited security resources in adversarial domains, and are currently used in deployed systems for LAX, the Federal Air Marshals, and the U.S.
Coast Guard. One of the major challenges in security games is finding solutions that are robust to uncertainty about the game model.
Bayesian game models have been used to model uncertainty, but algorithms for these games do not scale well enough for many applications. We take an alternative approach based on using intervals to
model uncertainty in security games. We present a fast polynomial
time algorithm for security games with interval uncertainty, which
represents the first viable approach for computing robust solutions
to very large security games. We also introduce a methodology for
using intervals to approximate solutions to infinite Bayesian games
with distributional uncertainty. Our experiments show that intervals can be an effective approach for these more general Bayesian
games; our algorithm is faster and results in higher quality solutions
than previous methods.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: [Multiagent systems]

Keywords
game theory; algorithms; interval uncertainty; security games

1.

INTRODUCTION

Security games [11, 22] are a general framework for modeling a
wide variety of resource allocation decisions in adversarial security
domains. These games are used to find optimal randomized strategies for a defender to deploy limited security resources to protect
vulnerable targets from attacks. Recently, they have been used in a
growing number of homeland security applications, including airport security [19, 20], scheduling for the Federal Air Marshals [23],
and patrolling strategies for the United States Coast Guard [21].
Game theory is also used for applications in cybersecurity [3, 16].
An important concern with using game theory to model realworld security problems is that the models require very precise and
accurate information about the capabilities and preferences of the
players. In practice, models are constructed using information provided by subject matter experts knowledgeable about the resources
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available for protection, the security risks and vulnerabilities of different targets, and the motivations of possible attackers. Unfortunately, there is often a high degree of uncertainty associated with
the information used to construct the models. For example, it is
difficult to know exactly what value a terrorist might perceive for
a successful attack against a given target, even through it may be
clear that some targets are more attractive to attackers than others.
This means that it may not be possible to give exact values for the
payoffs in different attack scenarios in a security game.
There is a growing emphasis on developing models and algorithms for security games that are able to represent various kinds
of uncertainty about the model, with the goal of generating robust
security strategies that are not highly sensitive to modeling errors.
The existing approaches are primarily based on Bayesian Stackelberg games that model uncertainty about payoffs, the observation
capabilities of an attacker, and other factors [17, 18, 10, 12, 28]. All
of these approaches suffer from problems with computational scalability and/or solution quality. Finite Bayesian Stackelberg games
are NP hard to solve [6], and experimental results show that they are
hard in practice as well. For infinite Bayesian Stackelberg games no
exact algorithm exist, and none of the existing methods give bounds
on solution quality [12].
The approach we take here is based on modeling uncertainty using intervals, rather than distributions. We take a worst-case optimization approach with respect to the interval uncertainty. In our
model, the defender in a security game knows only that the attacker’s payoffs are in some interval of possible values, and tries
to maximize the worst case outcome for any possible realization of
payoffs consistent with these intervals. Modeling uncertainty using
intervals is common in robust optimization [5], and this idea has
also been used to develop a notion of equilibrium in game theory
based on robust optimization [1]. The most closely related model
for security games is BRASS, which was introduced by Pita et al.
for robustness against human decision-makers [18]. BRASS is a
special case of our model.
The interval-based approach has advantages over Bayesian methods for modeling uncertainty. It is simpler for domain experts to understand and specify a model based on interval uncertainty because
the model does not require eliciting detailed information about probability distributions. In many cases, an interval model is a more natural and effective way to represent the game. We show in this paper
that interval models also have considerable computational advantages over Bayesian models. While Bayesian models are NP-hard,
we introduce a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for interval representations that provides tight bounds on solution quality.
For large security games, our algorithm may be the only computationally feasible approach for handling uncertainty.

The following are the primary contributions of this paper: (1)
we introduce an interval-based model of uncertainty for security
games, (2) we present a very fast polynomial algorithm for solving
interval security games, (3) we present a methodology for approximating security game with distributional uncertainty using intervals, which can be solved using our algorithm, and (4) we present
experimental results showing the value of the interval method for
increasing robustness, and showing that interval-based methods can
also provide fast approximations with high solution quality even
when distributional information is available.

2.

RELATED WORK

One of the motivations for out work is applications of Stackelberg games to real-world security domains [22]. They have been
used in fielded applications at the Los Angeles International Airport [19], the Federal Air Marshals Service [23], and the Coast
Guard [21]. There is also work on using game theory for patrolling
strategies for robots and unmanned vehicles [7, 2, 4] and applications of game theory in network security [3, 26, 16]. Much of this
work is computational in nature, and progress on security games
has been driven by algorithmic advances that can solve larger and
more complex games [6, 17, 9].
Robustness and uncertainty have been recognized as important
concerns in game theory by many authors. One of the most influential models, Bayesian games, was developed early in the history of game theory by John Harsanyi [8]. Worst-case approaches
also have a history in game theory, including many approaches
that build on the pessimistic notion of minmax strategies. However,
many of these take a worst-case view with respect to opponent behaviors, rather than the specification of the underlying game model.
One exception is robust equilibrium [1], which takes a worst-case
approach inspired by the robust optimization literature. There are
also several works that look at varying aspects of the problem of robustness in security games, most of which adopt a Bayesian framework for reasoning about uncertainty [17, 18, 10, 12, 28]. Finally,
fuzzy set theory is related to our approach, and the literature has explored a variety of methods for decision-making based on intervals
that could be explored as extensions of the model presented here in
future work [27, 15].

3.

SECURITY GAMES WITH INTERVALS

We first introduce the security game model [11], and then extend the model to include interval uncertainty about the attacker’s
payoffs. A security game has two players, a defender, Θ, and an attacker, Ψ. The defender is protects a set of targets T = {t1 , . . . , tn }
(e.g., airport terminals or computer servers) against attacks using
a limited number of resources, with the number of available resources denoted by m. We assume that all resources are identical
and can be used to protect any target. The set of pure strategies for
the attacker, denoted σΨ ∈ ΣΨ , correspond to actions attacking
exactly one target from T . Each pure strategy for the defender, denoted σΘ ∈ ΣΘ , corresponds to a subset of targets from T with
size less than or equal to m which the defender chooses to protect.
Following previous work on security games, we model the interaction as a Stackelberg game [25]. The defender first commits to
a mixed strategy δΘ that is a probability distribution over the pure
strategies from ΣΘ . The attacker then observes this mixed strategy
δΘ , and chooses a best response strategy from ΣΨ that gives the
attacker the maximum possible payoff. As in the previous work on
security games [22], we use Strong Stackelberg Equilbrium as the
standard solution concept, so ties in the attacker’s best responses

are broken in favor of the defender.1 In addition, we only need to
consider pure strategies for the attacker, since there always exists a
pure-strategy best response [17].
The payoffs for the game depend on which of the n targets is
attacked, and whether or not the target is protected (covered) by the
defender or not. Specifically, for an attack on target t, the defender
u
c
receives a payoff UΘ
(t) if the target is uncovered, and UΘ
(t) if
the target is covered. The payoffs for an attacker of type ω ∈ Ω is
u
c
UΨ
(t, ω) for an attack on an uncovered target, and UΨ
(t, ω) for an
attack on a covered target. We say that an attack on a covered target
is "unsuccessful" and an attack on an uncovered target is "successc
u
ful." In a security game we also assume that UΘ
(t) ≥ UΘ
(t) and
u
c
UΨ (t) ≥ UΨ (t) for all t ∈ T . In games with identical and unconstrained defender resources, we can use a compact representation
for the defenders strategies [11]. We represent the defender strategies as coverage vectors which give the probability that there is a
defender resource assigned to each target. These probabilities for
n
P
each target ti are denoted by ci , with
ci = m, and the full veci=1

tor of probabilities is denoted by C. Once the coverage probabilities are determined, the full joint security policy can be extracted
using a sampling algorithm similar to the comb sampling procedure
described in Tsai et al. [24]
Extension to Interval Uncertainty. We now introduce the Interval Security Games (ISG) model, which extends the standard
security game model so that the defender has uncertainty about the
attacker’s payoffs that is represented using intervals. We still assume that both the attacker and defender know their own payoffs
with certainty. In addition, we do not need to model the attacker
as having uncertainty about the defender’s payoffs because the attacker is able to directly observer the strategy of the defender, and
therefore does not require knowledge of the payoffs to predict the
defender’s strategy.
In the model, rather than having a single value representing the
attacker’s payoffs for the two cases of a successful and unsuccessc
u
(t)), we have pairs of values that repre(t) and UΨ
ful attack (UΨ
sent the maximum and minimum possible payoffs for a successful
or unsuccessful attack on target ti . We denote these values using
u,max
u,min
the notation UΨ
(t) and UΨ
(t) for the uncovered case, and
c,max
c,min
UΨ
(t) and UΨ
(t) for the covered case. The idea is that the
defender knows only that the attacker’s payoffs lie within a range
of possible values, and not the precise value. The defender does not
have information about the distribution of payoffs within these intervals, and therefore cannot compute an expected payoff. Therefore, we cannot apply the concept of Strong Stackelberg Equilbrium. Instead, we follow the literature on robust optimization and
take a worst-case approach. The defender’s goal in our framework
is to select a coverage vector, C, that maximizes the defenders
worst-case payoff over all of the possible ways that the attacker
payoffs could be chosen from the defined intervals.

4.

ANALYSIS OF ISG

In security games without intervals, we define the attack set to
be the set of all targets that give the attacker the maximum expected
payoff, given some coverage strategy C. For some classes of security games, finding the optimal coverage strategy can be reduced to
finding a coverage strategy that induces the maximum attack set,
while minimizing the attacker’s expected payoff [11]. In our model
1
The tie-breaking rule is not intuitive in adversarial games. While
there are arguments to support it they rely on precise maximization
by the attacker. We view this as one more reason to develop robust solutions like the ones described in this paper that do not rely
heavily on tie-breaking rules.

we cannot directly apply the idea of the attack set, but we can generalize it as follows. We define the potential attack set for a coverage
strategy C to be the set of all targets that could give the attacker the
maximum expected value, for any realization of attacker payoffs
consistent with the payoff intervals. For every target, the attacker
has a range of expected payoffs:
c,max
u,max
v max (ti ) = ci · UΨ
(ti ) + (1 − ci ) · UΨ
(ti )

(1)

c,min
u,min
v min (ti ) = ci · UΨ
(ti ) + (1 − ci ) · UΨ
(ti ).

(2)

Observe that for a given coverage vector C the attacker can guarantee a payoff of at least the maximum of the minimum values over
all targets; let us denote this value by R = maxti v min (ti ). Given
the value of R we can identify the targets that could be attacked
for some realization of the payoff values. Any target ti with a maximum expected value v max (ti ) ≥ R could be the best target for
the attacker to attack. To see this, suppose that the the attacker’s
payoff for ti is the maximum value in the interval, and the payoffs
for all other targets is are the minimal values, so that the best possible value for attacking any target other than ti is R. Therefore, the
potential attack set, Λ(C), is defined as:
Λ(C) = {ti : v max (ti ) ≥ R}

(3)

2. The target is not in the potential attack set Λ(C).
We now derive conditions that satisfy these conditions for each
target using the minimum amount of resources (i.e., coverage probability). We can calculate the coverage required to satisfy condition
1 for each target (if it is in Λ) from the equation for the defender’s
payoff. The minimal coverage for target ti is given by:
c1i = max(0, 1 −

u
D∗ − UΘ
(ti )
).
c
u
UΘ (ti ) − UΘ
(ti )

(6)

The problem now reduces to finding the potential attack set that
minimizes the overall coverage probability required to meet conditions 1 and 2 for all targets. A naïve approach would be to enumerate all of the possible attack sets and calculate the minimum
coverage for each such set. For any given set, we can calculate the
value of R directly, and then calculate the minimal coverage required for each target in Λ from Equation 6. For a given value of
R we can also calculate the minimum coverage that would be required on each target ti so that the target is not in Λ, which requires
that the maximum possible expected payoff for the attacking ti is
less than R. We calculate the minimum coverage as follows, using
the maximum attacker payoffs from the possible intervals:

The defender’s expected payoff for each target is:
c
u
di = ci · UΘ
(ti ) + (1 − ci ) · UΘ
(ti ).

(4)

The defender’s objective is to select a strategy C to maximize the
worst-case payoff over the targets in the potential attack set:
max( min di )
C

ti ∈Λ(C)

(5)

Note that this objective function specifies as worst-case approach
to uncertainty about the attacker’s payoffs, but still takes the expected payoffs with respect to the realizations of the coverage probabilities. This problem cannot be solved using linear programming
because the set of targets ti ∈ Λ(C) depends on C. It can be expressed as a mixed-integer program (MIP) which is a slightly generalized version of the MIP used for BRASS [18]. We omit this
MIP due to space constraints, but it can be found in [18].
The main idea of our approach is to transform the optimization
problem specified in the equations above into a series of feasibility problems. Our first observation is that the defender’s maximum
possible expected payoff increases monotonically as the number of
available resources m is increased. This follows as consequence
of the fact that the defender’s set of possible coverage strategies is
strictly larger for larger m. Using this observation, we can frame
the problem as a binary search in the space of defender expected
payoffs. In each iteration, we test whether the defender payoff at
the midpoint is feasible or not given the number of resources available. If it is not, the maximum payoff must be smaller than the
midpoint. If it is feasible, the maximum payoff is greater than or
equal to the midpoint. Using this strategy, we can approximate the
maximum payoff to within a very small tolerance.
To implement this approach, we need to analyze the problem
to determine whether a given defender payoff (denoted by D∗ ) is
feasible given the resources available, m. Since we are interested in
worst-case outcomes, this means that we need to guarantee that the
defender will achieve at least D∗ for any attacker payoffs in the
known intervals. For D∗ to be guaranteed by a coverage strategy
C, one of the following two conditions must hold for every target:
1. The target is in the potential attack set Λ(C), but the defender’s expected payoff if the target is attacked is at least
D∗ .

c2i = max(0, 1 −

u,max
R − UΨ
(ti )
).
u,max
− UΨ
(ti )

c,max
UΨ
(ti )

(7)

By summing the values of c1i for targets in Λ and c2i for the remaining targets, we get the minimum coverage required to guarantee D∗ for this potential attack set. Unfortunately, the number of
such sets is exponential in the number of targets, so enumerating
them is inefficient. To avoid this problem we make another observation that allows us to efficiently explore the candidate solutions.
For every set Λ there is a target, which we label t̂, that has the maximum minimum expected payoff, R. This is the target that defines
the value of R. Since there are only n targets, we can test each target as a candidate for t̂ and construct a coverage vector that meets
the necessary constraints using minimal resources. We present the
details of this construction in the next section. If the solution is feasible for any one of the n targets that are candidates for t̂, then the
value of D∗ is feasible. In the following section we describe an algorithm that uses this solution strategy to efficiently approximate
the optimal coverage vector C for the defender.

5.

ISG ALGORITHM

We now describe our algorithm for solving an ISG. The pseudocode is given in Algorithms 1 and 2. Algorithm 1 implements
binary search in the space of possible defender payoffs. The feasibility check is presented in Algorithm 2. The goal is to construct a
solution that will guarantee the defender D∗ while using the minimum resources; if we can construct a solution that uses less than
the available resources m we have found a feasible solution. The
strategy is to divide the search into n possible cases, each of which
corresponds to a different assumption about which target will have
the maximum guaranteed payoff for the attacker, R. The algorithm
iterates through each choice of ti as a candidate for this special
target t̂. For each case the algorithm constructs a coverage vector
using minimal coverage probability that guarantees the defender
D∗ based on the conditions 1 and 2 above.
First, for t̂ the target is part of the potential attack set in this solution based on our assumption that it will have the maximum minimum expected payoff. Therefore, if this target is attacked it must
give the defender an expected payoff of at least D∗ , as calculated

in Equation 6. We take the value c1t̂ necessary to ensure D∗ and
use this to calculate the value of R. This value of R is as high as
possible because we use the minimum coverage. We do not need to
consider adding additional coverage to t̂ to decrease the value of R
because this could only increase the coverage needed for any other
target. To see this, note that the values of c1i are independent of R
and the values of c2i increase monotonically as R decreases.
Now that we have the value of R, we calculate the value of c2i for
every other target. We calculate the minimum coverage required to
satisfy one of these two conditions by taking min(c1i , c2i ) for each
target. There is one final condition that must be met for each target
for our initial assumption to hold: the target we are assuming is
t̂ must have the maximum minimum expected payoff. We enforce
this by adding an additional constraint on the coverage probability
assigned to each target so that the maximum attacker payoff for the
target is less than the calculated value of R for t̂:

Algorithm 2 feasibilityCheck
for all ti ∈ T do
midP oint−U u (ti )
)
c1i ← max(0, 1 − U c (ti )−U uΘ
Θ
Θ (ti )
end for
for all ti ∈ T do
totalCov ← c1i
ci ← c1i
if ci > 1 then
GOT O next ti
end if
c,min
u,min
R ← (c1i · UΨ
(ti )) + ((1 − c1i ) · UΨ
(ti )) − 0
for all tj ∈ {T \ti } do
c2j ← max(0, 1 −
c3j ← max(0, 1 −

u,max

(tj )
R−UΨ
)
u,max
(tj )
(tj )−UΨ

c,max

UΨ

u,min
(tj )
R−UΨ
u,min
c,min
(tj )
(tj )−UΨ
UΨ

)

max(c3i , min(c1i , c2i ))

c3i = max(0, 1 −

u,min
R − UΨ
(ti )
).
c,min
u,min
UΨ
(ti ) − UΨ
(ti )

(8)

These values increase monotonically as R decreases. The overall
minimum coverage for each target is given by max(c3i , min(c1i , c2i )).
We sum these coverages over all targets and compare this with
the available resources m to determine whether this selection of
t̂ yields a feasible solution. If this case does not yield a feasible
solution, the algorithm continues testing the other targets as candidates for t̂. As soon as a feasible solution is found, the subroutine
terminates and the binary search continues.
The worst-case complexity of the algorithm is O(n2 · log(1/))
where  is the error tolerance parameter for the binary search. Each
feasibility check requires one iteration to test each target as t̂, and
each iteration does several constant-time operations on each target to determine the minimal coverage. Therefore, the feasibility
check has complexity O(n2 ). Binary search requires O(log(1/))
iterations to converge within , giving the overall complexity of
O(n2 · log(1/)).
Algorithm 1 ISG Solver
for all ti ∈ T do
ci ← 0
end for
maxP ayof f ← 0
u
(ti )
minP ayof f ← minti ∈T UΘ
while maxP ayof f − minP ayof f >  do
midP oint ← (maxP ayof f − minP ayof f )/2
if feasibilityCheck(midP oint, m, C) then
minP ayof f ← midP oint
else
maxP ayof f ← M idP oint
end if
end while
return C
In addition to our own ISG algorithm we implemented a mixedinteger program (MIP) that computes an exact solution for interval
security games. This MIP model is used as a benchmark in the experimental evaluation. We do not described this MIP here due to
space constraints, but note that the formulation is a minor variation
of the BRASS MIP formulation presented in Pita et al. [18].

minCov ←
if minCov < 0 || minCov > 1 then
GOT O next ti
end if
totalCov ← totalCov + minCov
cj ← minCov
end for
if totalCov ≤ m then
return TRUE, C
end if
end for
return FALSE

6.

SECURITY GAMES WITH
DISTRIBUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY

An alternative way to model uncertainty about payoffs is to use
distributions instead of intervals to represent possible values. The
distributional security games (DSG) model introduced by Kiekintveld et al. [12] uses this approach, and presents several approximation algorithms for computing solutions to DSG. The DSG model
contains more information than our model because it has access to
distributional information, however, this has two significant drawbacks: (1) The models are more problematic to accurately define,
since they require the domain expert to specify a large number of
payoff distributions. (2) It is computationally challenging to solve
infinite Bayesian Stackelberg games that represent distributional information; no exact algorithms are known for this class of games,
and even heuristic approximations are expensive.
For these reasons, it is often preferable to use an interval model
to represent uncertainty instead of a distributional model. We also
show in this paper that we can use our interval algorithm as an
efficient way to approximate solutions even when distributional information is available. We begin by introducing the DSG model,
and then show how we can transform a DSG into an interval game
which we can solve with our efficient interval algorithm. In the experimental results we compare the approximation results using intervals with the best known approximation methods for DSG games.
A distributional security game extends the security game model
(see Section 3) in a similar way to ISG. The difference is that the
attacker’s payoffs are represented by continuous probability density functions (e.g., uniform distributions or Gaussian distributions)
instead of intervals. Formally, this becomes an infinite Bayesian
Stackelberg game with an infinite number of attacker types, and
the game unfolds as follows: (1) the defender commits to a mixed
strategy (2) nature chooses a random attacker type ω ∈ Ω with

probability P b(ω), (3) the attacker observes the defender’s mixed
strategy, and (4) the attacker responds to the mixed strategy with a
best-response that provides the attacker (of type ω) with the highest expected payoff. We define the type distribution by replacing
c
u
the payoffs values UΨ
(t, ω), UΨ
(t, ω) for each target t ∈ T with
two continuous probability density functions that represent the defender’s beliefs about the attacker payoffs:
Z
c
c
fΨ
(t, r) =
P b(ω)UΨ
(t, ω)dω
(9)
ω∈Ω
u
fΨ
(t, r)

Z
=

u
P b(ω)UΨ
(t, ω)dω

(10)

ω∈Ω
c
For example, the defender expects with probability fΨ
(t, r) that the
attacker receives payoff r for attacking target t when it is covered.
For some coverage vector C, let Xt (C) be a random variable that
describes the expected attacker payoffs for attacking target t, given
C. We then define the probability that the attacker will choose target t for each target t ∈ T as follows:

at (C)

= P b[Xt (C) > Xt0 (C) for all t0 ∈ T \ t] (11)

because the attacker acts rationally. Conceptually, this gives the
probability that the attacker will choose to attack each target for a
given coverage vector C and the probability distributions of the attacker’s payoffs. Using these probabilities, we can calculate the expected payoff for the defender. The original paper presents a derivation of an analytic formula for these probabilities, but it cannot be
solved directly. Instead, Monte Carlo simulation is used to estimate
the attack probabilities. We generate one sample attacker type by
sampling payoffs from each of the payoff distribution; these are
the payoff values assigned to that type. Using those payoff values
we can calculate the best-response for this attacker type against the
coverage strategy C. We sample a large number of types to estimate
the expected value of a coverage strategy for a DSG.
In our experiments, we benchmark again the Greedy Monte Carlo
(GMC) algorithm introduced by Kiekintveld et al [12]. This was
found to be the method that was fastest and had the highest quality
solutions for instances of DSG, especially when scaling up to large
games. The GMC method is based on sampling a large number
of attacker types (thousands) using Monte-Carlo sampling. It uses
a greedy heuristic to approximate the optimal defender coverage
strategy against the sampled attacker types.
To apply our interval algorithm to distributional security games
we translate the distribution for each payoff to an interval. There
are many ways to do this but we use a simple method that centers the interval around the mean of the distribution and determines
the size of the interval based on the standard deviation of the interval and a multiplier. The multiplier is a parameter of the algorithm, and allows us to have intervals that include a larger or smaller
fraction of the possible payoff values in the distribution. The minimum value for the interval is calculated as mean − (StdDev ·
multiplier) and the maximum values is calculated as mean +
(StdDev · multiplier). Figure 1 shows this visually.

7.

EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

We begin by evaluating the runtime and solution quality of the
ISG solver on interval security games, and then present results on
distributional security games.

7.1

Interval Game Experiments

First, we tested the speed of the ISG solver against an exact MIP
formulation based on BRASS. We tested the algorithms on 30 ran-

Figure 1: A payoff interval for a Gaussian distribution.

domly generated sample games with defender payoffs for successful attacks drawn uniform random between 0 and −100, and the
attacker payoffs for successful attacks drawn uniformly between 0
and 100. We modify the attacker payoffs to be intervals by using the
first value drawn as the minimum value and setting the maximum
value by adding a uniform random value between 0 and 20. The
payoffs for unsuccessful attacks are 0 for both players. We fixed
the number of resources at 20% of the number of targets.
In Figure 2(a) we present results for the MIP (solved using GLPK
version 4.36) and ISG with three different tolerance settings. The
tolerance settings control the accuracy of the binary search. All
three ISG instances are much faster, even with an error tolerance
of just 0.0001. Figure 2(b) shows results for the three ISG settings
on much larger games. Here we see a modest increase in solution
time with increasing accuracy. Even for 10000 targets and the highest accuracy setting, ISG solves the game in half the time required
by the MIP to solve games with only 300 targets.
We also ran experiments to test the impact of interval uncertainty on solution quality under varying assumptions about the attacker strategy. For this experiment we used 200 randomly generated games with defender payoffs for successful attacks drawn
from the range −20 to −10, and attacker payoffs between10 and
20. Payoffs for unsuccessful attacks were 0 for both players. The
baseline case has no uncertainty about the attacker’s payoffs. We
solved these games using an existing linear-time solver for security games [14]. We then added increasing amounts of interval uncertainty to the attacker’s payoffs, and solved the resulting games
using the ISG solver.
The results are shown in Figure 2(c). On the x-axis is the size of
the intervals for the attacker’s payoffs. On the y-axis is the expected
payoff for the defender. The four lines represent four different assumptions about the attacker. The Nash attacker always plays the
optimal attacker strategy computed in the case with no uncertainty
(in this case, the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is the same as the
Nash strategy [13]). The Stackelberg attacker is able to observe the
exact coverage strategy and chooses a best-response, as in a Strong
Stackelberg Equilibrium. The worst case attacker always chooses
the worst possible target for the defender, without regard to the attacker’s own payoffs. Finally, the guaranteed payoff is the payoff
that the ISG method is able to guarantee against any rational attacker with payoffs that lie within the given intervals.
In the results there is a small decrease in the payoffs for the solutions to the interval games against the Nash and Stackelberg attackers. This is expected, and can be interpreted as the price of
robustness to payoff uncertainty. The advantage of the ISG method
is seen in the guaranteed and worst case payoffs. There is an in-

(a) Comparison of solution time for ISG and (b) The effect of varying the tolerance on ISG (c) Impact of interval uncertainty on solution
the MIP solved using CPLEX.
solution time.
quality and robustness
Figure 2: Runtime and solution quality analysis for ISG.
creasing trend in the worst-case payoffs for ISG, with the strongest
results for larger intervals. More importantly, the method is able to
guarantee high payoffs for smaller amounts of possible variation in
the attacker’s payoffs, anywhere within the specified intervals.

7.2

Distributional Game Experiments

Our next set of experimental results evaluates the potential for
ISG to be used as a fast approximation algorithm for distributional
security games. We compare the performance of ISG using our
methodology for transforming distributional security games into
approximate versions based on intervals to the best existing methods for DSG, Greedy Monte Carlo (GMC) [12] and BRASS [18].
We run experiments on the same three classes of distributional
games used by Kiekintveld et al., games with Uniform payoffs distributions games with Gaussian distributions with the same standard deviation for every payoff, and games with Gaussian distributions with varying standard deviations.
We generated 300 random instances of each class of games. The
games were generated by first drawing random rewards and penalties for both players. All rewards were drawn from U[6; 8] and
penalties were drawn from U[2; 4]. We then generated distributions
of the correct type for the attacker’s payoff, using the values from
the first stage as the mean. In uniform games we vary the length of
the uniform interval to increase or decrease uncertainty. For Gaussian games we vary the standard deviation, and all payoffs have
the same amount of uncertainty. Gaussian variable games have a
different standard deviation for each payoff distribution, which are
drawn from U[0; 1] in our experiments.
All three of the algorithms we tested have parameters. For GMC
the two main parameters that control the solution time and quality are the number of sample attacker types used in the calculation, and the size of the increment used in the greedy allocation of
coverage probability. Solution quality improves with a larger number of types and a smaller increment, but solution time increases.
We include both a "low" and "high" quality set of parameters for
GMC; the specific settings are given in Table 1. The parameter for
BRASS is , and reflects how far attackers may be from choosing
the optimal target. The parameters for ISG are the multiplier used
to generate the interval game from the distributional game, and the
tolerance. The tolerance does not have a large effect on the solution
quality (because we can always get very small error), so we fix this
at 0.0001 in our experiments.
The BRASS epsilon parameter and the ISG multiplier can both
have a significant effect on the solution quality, and there is no obvious way to set the value of these parameters. The best value can
depend on the size of the game, the type of uncertainty, and the
amount of uncertainty (e.g., the standard deviation of the distribu-

Table 1: Parameter settings for the algorithms.
Parameter
Values
ISG Multipliers
0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0
BRASS Epsilons 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0
GMC Low
increment 0.05,1000 types
GMC High
increment 0.01,10000 types

tion). We tested a variety of parameter settings to select the ones
that gave the best results. The set of candidate values for each algorithm is shown in Table 1. Figure 3(g) shows an example of an
experiment to find the best parameters games with Gaussian uncertainty for the ISG algorithm. The amount of uncertainty (i.e.,
standard deviation) varies along the x-axis, the value of the best
parameter setting is given on the y-axis, and each line represents
a class of games with a different number of targets. In general, the
best multipliers are smaller for smaller games and games with more
uncertainty. The need to do some experimentation to find a good parameter setting for ISG is not a significant practical concern. These
settings could be used based on known values for similar games,
and the algorithm is fast enough that testing a few different parameter settings on a specific game would not be prohibitive. In all of
our experiments, we tested all of the values in the table for both
BRASS and ISG, and selected the one that gave the best result for
the specific setting.
The first three plots, 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c) compare the solution
qualities achieved by the algorithms on games with 15 targets and
3 resources. For the Uniform and Gaussian games we vary the
amount of payoff uncertainty on the x-axis by varying the standard deviations of the attacker’s payoff distributions. For Gaussian
Variable games we use only a single setting, since the amount of
uncertainty varies on a per-payoff basis in these games. In all cases,
the defender’s expected payoff for the solution is plotted on the yaxis. This is evaluated after the algorithms return solutions by using
a very large number of Monte-Carlo sample types (100000) to give
a very accurate estimate of the expected payoff for the proposed
coverage solution. We also include a final baseline called "Mean"
that solves the game optimally by assuming that the mean of the
distribution is the exact payoff value (in other words, it ignores the
uncertainty in payoffs and solves it as a standard security game).
The mean baseline performs poorly in all cases. For uniform
games, ISG has the highest solution quality, followed closely by
BRASS. For Gaussian and Gaussian variable games ISG performs
slightly worse than the GMC methods, particularly when there is
a large amount of uncertainty, but the performance is still competitive. In the second set of plots, 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f), we fix the

(a) Solution quality results for small games (b) Solution quality results for small games (c) Solution quality results for small games
with uniform attacker payoff distributions.
with Gaussian attacker payoff distributions. with Gaussian variable attacker payoff distributions.

(d) Solution quality results scaling to larger (e) Solution quality results scaling to larger (f) Solution quality results scaling to larger
games for uniform attacker payoff distribu- games for Gaussian attacker payoff distribu- games for Gaussian variable attacker payoff
tions.
tions.
distributions.

(g) Parameter optimization for ISG on games (h) Comparison of solution times for solving
with Gaussian distributions.
large Gaussian games.
Figure 3: Solution quality and computation time comparisons.
amount of uncertainty for each the classes of games and vary the
number of targets to assess performance on larger games. The standard deviation for uniform and Gaussian games is fixed at 0.5, and
Gaussian variable games use the same distribution of standard deviations as before. BRASS is not included because it required too
much memory to complete for the larger problems. The pattern of
results is similar to the smaller games. In uniform games there is
a greater separation, with ISG outperforming GMC. On Gaussian
and Gaussian variable games, GMC has higher solution quality, but
the overall difference between GMC and ISG is small.
The final result is presented in Figure 3(h). This plot compares
the runtimes for computing solutions on the large Gaussian games
(results for the other classes of games are very similar. Here we
see that the solution times for both BRASS and GMC high rapidly
increase as the size of the game increases. The solution times for
GMC low and mean grow more reasonably. However, ISG is by
far the fastest algorithm. It is fast enough to scale well beyond 100
targets, as seen in the previous set of results. Overall, ISG offers
very fast solutions and either superior or competitive solution quality for approximating distributional games, depending on the type
of uncertainty. It is a particularly good choice for accounting for

uncertainty in very large games or situations where very fast performance is needed; in these cases it may be the only feasible method
from a computational perspective that can account for uncertainty.

8.

CONCLUSION

Security games have important real-world applications, but one
of the critical questions is how to account for uncertainty and error
in building the analyzing the game models. If the solutions are not
robust to the kinds of errors and uncertainties that arise in modeling real problems, then they will not be useful in many situations. However, many of the standard approaches for handling uncertainty, such as Bayesian games, are very challenging from both
a model elicitation standpoint and a computational standpoint.
We have introduced a new model of security games with uncertainty that is based on using intervals to represent possible payoffs,
and takes a worst-case approach to uncertainty. This approach is
motivated in part by the literature on robust optimization and more
recently work on robust game theory concepts. We show that modeling uncertainty using intervals has distinct computational advantages. We present a highly efficient polynomial algorithm for approximating solutions to interval security games within very small

(negligible) error bounds. Our experiment results show that this algorithm is much faster than equivalent MIP formulations.
In addition, we show that intervals can be used to approximate
infinite Bayesian games with distributional uncertainty. We develop
a methodology for modeling the infinite games using games with
intervals, which can then be solved using our fast algorithm for
ISG. In our experiments, the solutions found using this intervalbased approach are surprisingly good–in all cases they are competitive with the best known methods for directly approximating the
solutions to the Bayesian games, and in some cases the quality is
even better. In addition, the speed of the solutions is much faster,
and we can scale to extremely large games using this approach.
This provides a computationally feasible way to account for uncertainty even in very challenging cases of security games. Our success in applying interval-based models in this case also suggests
interesting directions for future work in applying these principles
to manage uncertainty in more general classes of games.
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